The intensity of the debates about open theism may have died down, but questions about God's knowledge (especially his knowledge of the world) seem perennial.
Bavinck offers at least two grounds for confessing divine foreknowledge, but he also calls into question the very notion of it as a really distinct category of divine knowledge. First, he believes that all time is present to God, making it straightforward that God would know all things about the future. Second, Bavinck robustly articulates the doctrine of divine aseity (God has life in and of himself, independently of any created entities) and infers from this that, as one aspect of God, God's knowledge doesn't depend upon any happenings in the created order. God has knowledge of these before they come to pass. Yet, as mentioned, Bavinck makes us think twice about the very notion of divine foreknowledge. As with aseity, his confession of divine simplicity (essentially, God is not composed of parts) leads to an inference about God's knowledge, namely, that it is not composed of parts. In other words, we're not permitted to carve up God's knowledge as if it were composed of knowledge of the past, knowledge of the present, and knowledge of the future. Rather, God's singular knowledge includes these as aspects.
Important thoughts, I think, but the title of the post promised something about Molinism, a. k. a. middle knowledge, a perspective on divine foreknowledge traced to Roman Catholic thinker Luis de Molina and advocated today by the likes of William Lane Craig of Talbot. In order to uphold God's sovereignty over the details of his creation and his allowance for libertarian freewill, Molinists assert that God conceived of all possible events, persons, etc. and, knowing just how in all cases one thing would lead to another, chose to create such that he set in motion the course of history so that the best possible world results given the liabilities of libertarian freewill for human beings. (Please check me on this if it is a caricature.)
At the ETS conference last year Craig said middle knowledge is a versatile and useful doctrine, full of potential for answering difficult questions or objections to the Christian faith. In light of this, and in light of the fact that some of my most enjoyable theological conversations have been with a Molinist friend who might respond to this post (!), here goes Bavinck's critique of Molinism in a nutshell:
"God does not derive his knowledge of the free actions of human beings from his own being, his own decrees, but from the will of his creatures. God, accordingly, becomes dependent on the world, derives knowledge from the world that he did not have and could not obtain from himself, and hence, in his knowledge, ceases to be one, simple, and independent - that is, God."
(Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, p. 201)
Is this one a softball for Molinists/middle knowledgers? What do you make of it?
P. S. If you are a Molinist and regard this as a softball, don't let it drive you away from Bavinck on the whole; his Dogmatics is magisterial.
Duby - so . . . put this into English for me.
ReplyDeleteIs Bavinck arguing that middle knowledge is rubbish? And that God's act of creation was independent of previously known human actions?
Help me to get this.
Hey Matt,
ReplyDeleteThanks for dropping by!
Bavinck does disagree with the doctrine of middle knowledge especially because, in his mind, it renders God dependent upon his creatures' decision-making and acting. Emphasizing the role of the divine decree in bringing things to pass in the world, he wants to make sure that the ground of God's knowledge is not external to God himself. Otherwise, there would be a threat to God's independence and freedom.
I think the answer to the second part of your question is in one sense 'yes' and in another 'no.' For Bavinck, God's creative action is not informed or determined by the choices of creatures, but when God acts to create he does so with knowledge of what will pass. Bavinck just wants to make clear that that knowledge is not a function of passively viewing what human beings will choose to do.
thanks dr. duby . . . much clearer
ReplyDeleteso will you now give us your thoughts on middle knowledge?
I'm certainly not an expert on it, but, for my part, I would say it has some attractive features. In particular, it aims to honor the comprehensiveness of God's providence in such a way that God doesn't look as if he prods people to commit acts of evil.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I still have some questions about it. It sounds useful to posit that God considers how things will unfold in history given possible starting points and then actualizes a world that constitutes the best possible world given the presence of libertarian freewill. But, unless I'm caricaturing middle knowledge, it sounds a bit deistic. I wonder how thoroughly Molinists have wrestled with the reality of divine action and intervention beyond the initial work of creation. (If anyone reading knows of a Molinist who does wrestle with this, please chime in.) Also, it seems like it can be and has been co-opted by Calvinists and Arminians alike to bolster their respective theologies, making me wonder if more work could be done to clarify the contours of middle knowledge.
gotcha . . . I have always thought middle knowledge sounds nice, but I can't prove or disprove it very easily. So to make sweeping theological statements with middle knowledge as a fundamental premise smacks of weak theologizing to me. One might work up to middle knowledge (maybe) to explain divine sovereignty and human responsibility, but to then go back and reconstruct a theology of divine sovereignty and human responsibility based on middle knowledge seems a bit sketchy.
ReplyDeleteMatt,
ReplyDeleteThanks for some good interaction here. It's exciting to talk about theological questions with a fellow seminarian who is called to pastor and, I believe, is pursuing that calling very thoughtfully.
Up next, blogging on the next trend in biblical theology: the majesty of the hendiadys in the Pastoral Epistles...or not...