Showing posts with label Herman Bavinck. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Herman Bavinck. Show all posts

Monday, January 18, 2010

Time and History: Tensions in Ladd

I tend to cringe a bit when in a song for worship or in everyday conversation the Christian hope of the life to come is described as a flight from planet earth or a cessation of creaturely existence in time. On the latter, I resonate with Bavinck: "Time is the necessary form of the existence of the finite" (Reformed Dogmatics, 1:429). Yet, in the new creation, "Time is charged with the eternity of God" (Reformed Dogmatics, 4:729). To develop this a bit further, time just is the creaturely mode of existence and it seems odd to expect this feature of reality to come to a halt with the eschaton and the advent of the new creation. After all, eternality is an incommunicable divine perfection. However, we can expect that the intensification of the presence of God among us, beautifully laid out in Revelation 21, will somehow rework the "feel" of creaturely existence in time. Time continues for us creatures, albeit in an eschatologically revamped sort of way.

With this as a backdrop, I appreciated the comment from Ladd: "In biblical thought, eternity is unending time" (A Theology of the New Testament, 44). But later on he avers, "The Kingdom of God involves two great moments: fulfillment within history and consummation at the end of history" (ibid., 90). To give him the benefit of the doubt, Ladd may not mean that, strictly speaking, history as such reaches its conclusion with the consummation of redemptive history. However, I wonder if it might be better to say simply that the inbreaking of the kingdom has two great moments: an inaugural one in the mission of Christ and a consummative one in the future ("future" instead of "end of history"). I don't mean to pick on Ladd, but I think that, in the name of recovering in the church the earthy, presumably temporal contours of resurrection life, selecting different terminology does have some value. Thoughts?

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

On Making Peace with Faith in Our Intellectual Work

One more reason to befriend Bavinck:

"[T]here are objections and conundrums in every science.  Those who do not want to start in faith will never arrive at knowledge.  Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, is the first principle of philosophy, but it is riddled with mystery from start to finish.  Those who do not want to embark on scientific investigation until they see the road by which we arrive at knowledge fully cleared will never start.  Those who do not want to eat before they understand the entire process by which food arrives at their table will starve to death.  And those who do not want to believe the Word of God before they see all problems resolved will die of spiritual starvation" (Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, p. 442).  



Thursday, July 23, 2009

Between Extremes

Sometimes setting up one's own perspective as the mediating or "holistic" one can be a rather cheap way to win an argument. Two examples. (1) If the options are framed as hardcore fatalism, Calvinism, and the utter loss of divine sovereignty, Calvinism might prematurely appear best (this is not to say that it couldn't appear that way after further thought!). However, Calvinism and Arminianism both are probably somewhere in the middle with hardcore fatalism and open theism on the edges. Let the curious scrupulously explore Holy Scripture and the Christian tradition to weigh Calvinism and Arminianism. (2) If the options are framed as chauvinism, complementarianism, and over-the-top feminism, complementarianism might prematurely appear best (as with Calvinism, this isn't meant to imply that it couldn't appear that way after further thought). However, complementarianism and egalitarianism both are probably somewhere in the middle with chauvinism and over-the-top feminism on the edges.

Having said all of this, as I'm reading through Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics, I pick up that he regularly situates his work between two extremes in such a way that it pushes him to take extra care in his theological formulations. In other words, in his case, a between-extremes approach proves beneficial. On the matter of the authority of Scripture and the relationship between word and Spirit, Bavinck masterfully avoids Rome's desire to ground the authority of Scripture in the authentication of the church and also Radical Reformers' desire to bypass the constraints of the word and view the Spirit's speaking apart from Scripture as the supreme authority for Christian belief and praxis. On the doctrine of God, Bavinck continually presses on between the blunders of deism and pantheism, maintaining God's immanence and independence and transcendence. On the matter of ecclesial power, he again walks the line between Rome and the Radicals and ends up arguing that both in their own way ascribe the state's power to the church!

Thoughts on doing "between-extremes theology" for refinement rather than caricature?

Saturday, July 18, 2009

Bavinck on Athanasius and the Importance of Trinitarianism

"Athanasius understood better than any of his contemporaries that Christianity stands or falls with the confession of the deity of Christ and the Trinity. He devoted his entire life and all his energies to the defense of this truth. He was not fighting for a philosophical problem, but for the Christian religion itself, for the revelation of God, the teaching of the apostles, the faith of the church. The Trinity is the heart and center of Christianity, differentiating it in principle from Judaism, which denies the distinctions within the divine being, and from paganism, which rejects the oneness of God."

Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, p. 285

Saturday, July 11, 2009

Bavinck on the Attributes of God Pt. 2: Calling All Molinists!

The intensity of the debates about open theism may have died down, but questions about God's knowledge (especially his knowledge of the world) seem perennial.

Bavinck offers at least two grounds for confessing divine foreknowledge, but he also calls into question the very notion of it as a really distinct category of divine knowledge. First, he believes that all time is present to God, making it straightforward that God would know all things about the future. Second, Bavinck robustly articulates the doctrine of divine aseity (God has life in and of himself, independently of any created entities) and infers from this that, as one aspect of God, God's knowledge doesn't depend upon any happenings in the created order. God has knowledge of these before they come to pass. Yet, as mentioned, Bavinck makes us think twice about the very notion of divine foreknowledge. As with aseity, his confession of divine simplicity (essentially, God is not composed of parts) leads to an inference about God's knowledge, namely, that it is not composed of parts. In other words, we're not permitted to carve up God's knowledge as if it were composed of knowledge of the past, knowledge of the present, and knowledge of the future. Rather, God's singular knowledge includes these as aspects.

Important thoughts, I think, but the title of the post promised something about Molinism, a. k. a. middle knowledge, a perspective on divine foreknowledge traced to Roman Catholic thinker Luis de Molina and advocated today by the likes of William Lane Craig of Talbot. In order to uphold God's sovereignty over the details of his creation and his allowance for libertarian freewill, Molinists assert that God conceived of all possible events, persons, etc. and, knowing just how in all cases one thing would lead to another, chose to create such that he set in motion the course of history so that the best possible world results given the liabilities of libertarian freewill for human beings. (Please check me on this if it is a caricature.)

At the ETS conference last year Craig said middle knowledge is a versatile and useful doctrine, full of potential for answering difficult questions or objections to the Christian faith. In light of this, and in light of the fact that some of my most enjoyable theological conversations have been with a Molinist friend who might respond to this post (!), here goes Bavinck's critique of Molinism in a nutshell:

"God does not derive his knowledge of the free actions of human beings from his own being, his own decrees, but from the will of his creatures. God, accordingly, becomes dependent on the world, derives knowledge from the world that he did not have and could not obtain from himself, and hence, in his knowledge, ceases to be one, simple, and independent - that is, God."

(Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 2, p. 201)

Is this one a softball for Molinists/middle knowledgers? What do you make of it?

P. S. If you are a Molinist and regard this as a softball, don't let it drive you away from Bavinck on the whole; his Dogmatics is magisterial.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

Herman Bavinck on the Attributes of God Pt. I

Bavinck's presentation of the doctrine of God is, in a word, masterful. In his section on the trustworthiness of God he discusses what we mean when we call God "the Truth." According to Bavinck's organisation, biblical teaching on this subject is threefold.

First, there is a metaphysical dimension to the truthfulness of God. That is, he is all that belongs to the divine nature, which is itself characterized according to God's own idea of divinity. Other "gods" do not conform to true divinity (which, again, is determined by God's own idea of divinity) and thus are deceptive, mere pretenders.

Second, there is what Bavinck calls an ethical dimension to the truthfulness of God. He is truthful in that his self-revelation corresponds to his being. His communication to us, while always accomodated to the finitude of the human mind, always accurately reflects his nature and actions. He speaks the truth about himself and always fulfills his promises.

Third, there is what Bavinck calls the logical (or epistemological) dimension of the truthfulness of God. That is, the content of God's thoughts corresponds to the way things are. In other words, his knowledge is just that: knowledge. "God's knowledge is dynamic, absolute, fully correspondent truth. It is not acquired by research and reflection but is inherent in the divine being (essential) and precedes the existence of things."

I'm thankful to God for his people's thick descriptions of him!

I wonder what it would look like to relate this three-pronged account of truthfulness to humanity. Are we, like Christ, living out all that belongs to true humanity as determined by God? Does our speech disclose only the truth about who we are and what we will do? Do we seek after authentic knowledge of God and his world?

Saturday, June 13, 2009

There Really Is Nothing New under the Sun

As I read through volume one of Herman Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics (a magisterial four-volume work only recently fully translated into English) I am reminded again of that comment in Ecclesiastes. In dealing with the epistemologies of Locke, Hume, Kant, and others, Bavinck ends up giving arguments that in many ways could have been written to respond to the controversies over postmodernism in the contemporary theological landscape. He does a remarkable job of holding together a mosaic of important epistemological commitments that are instructive for Christian thinkers today.

After reading some recent authors, one might get the impression that only with the advent of postmodernism were we made aware of the noetic effects of the fall or human inability wholly to discard bias as we study God. Bavinck's work prods us to sit at the feet of the Christian tradition to recover wisdom for addressing the theological problems of our day.